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The performance of the Office of the Comptroller 
and Auditor General (OCAG) is pivotal in promoting 
accountability in managing public resources as well 
as containing the fiscal deficit at a sustainable level. 
Both are goals articulated by the Government of 
Bangladesh in its National Strategy for Accelerated 
Poverty Reduction (GOB, 2008). By auditing
government income and expenditure, the OCAG 
identifies violations of the law and the standards of 
ethics, and deviations from the principles of efficiency 
and effectiveness in public resource management. 
While a significant amount of the public money is saved 
from misappropriation each year due to the role played 
by the OCAG, rampant public sector corruption and 
inefficiency in Bangladesh indicate the need for further 
strengthening of the Comptroller and Auditor General 
(CAG)’s audit functions to act as an effective deterrent. 
In the last few years the OCAG has already undertaken 
a number of commendable initiatives to make its role 
stronger in ensuring stewardship of public money. 
In order to support these initiatives, the Institute of 
Governance Studies (IGS) has developed 20 policy 
recommendations in a participatory manner1. During 
formulation of this policy note, priority has been given 
to reform options which are causally linked to result-
based performance as well as practicable in the given 
context. The policy recommendations cover four 
thematic areas: 
Theme 1- Independence: The OCAG and its 
individual auditors should remain free from any kind 
of pressure or influence from the executive, audited 
entity and other outside interest groups in all matters 
relating to its auditing function.
Theme 2- Accountability: The OCAG should 
be accountable for its actions and obligations by 
external and internal means. External accountability 
Institutions of Accountability: Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General Policy Note 01
BRAC University
Institutions of Accountability Series
is to the Parliament, taxpayers and citizens more 
generally. Internal accountability may require the strict 
enforcement of its own code of conduct, supervision 
and other techniques of internal control.
Theme 3- Efficiency: The OCAG, especially its 
human resources, structure and management should 
be competent enough for conducting audit related 
activities in a cost-effective manner.
Theme 4- Effectiveness: The OCAG should meet 
its mandate2 and mission3 by producing standard 
and timely audit reports and facilitating appropriate 
actions being taken on report findings and 
recommendations. 
1. INDEPENDENCE 
1.1 The Nature and Content of an Enabling Act for 
Functional Autonomy
No enabling law exists at present, describing the 
authority of the OCAG in relation to other government 
agencies.4 The OCAG enjoys limited functional 
January 2010
1 IGS organised an international workshop on 7 January 
2009 to facilitate a deliberative process to formulate policy 
recommendations. This Policy Note is based on the workshop 
discussions, literature review and an empirical study conducted 
in the preparation for the workshop as well as consultations with 
the OCAG itself.  
2 Article 128 of the Constitution of Bangladesh specifies the 
mandate to audit and report on the public accounts of the 
Republic and of all courts of law and all authorities and offices of 
the Government.
3 Annual Report, 2007 of the OCAG stipulates the mission as 
‘conducting effective audit and evaluating public sector operations 
to provide reliable and objective information for ensuring honest, 
efficient and cost-effective governance’. 
4 The Comptroller and Auditor General (Additional Functions) Act, 
1974 and its amendment in 1983 deal with audit jurisdiction of 
the Office.
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autonomy contrary to its constitutional status. It 
depends on the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the 
Ministry of Establishment (MoE) for managerial issues 
relating to personnel management, reorganisation and 
finance. The Finance Division controls the Audit and 
Accounts cadre, an arrangement which deters the 
OCAG from taking effective administrative decisions. 
Policy recommendation: Parliament may enact 
an enabling Act for the OCAG, providing it with 
necessary functional autonomy in personnel 
management. 
The Act should confer the CAG with the authority to 
recruit and reward officials according to the need of the 
Office, but excluding the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Commission5 (PSC). The government will have to enact 
service rules for the officials of the OCAG including their 
recruitment, promotion, discipline, etc. in concurrence 
with the CAG. The rules may provide that the CAG will 
apprise MoF and MoE, but will not need to seek their 
approval about personnel matters, except matters relating 
to major structural and legal reforms.  Concerning career 
management of class I (cadre and non-cadre) officers 
working in the Office, the CAG might be entrusted with 
the authority to manage their careers up to a certain level 
(e.g. grade V or IV of the National Pay Scale). However, 
legal problems might arise to confer such autonomy to 
the OCAG as long as it (except for the CAG) remains 
a part of the civil service, which requires observance of 
civil service rules and practices. A probable solution is to 
make the OCAG an independent statutory body.   
 
In terms of finance, the Constitution states (Article 88) 
that the remuneration of the CAG, the salary of his/
her employees and administrative expenses of his/
her office are charged under the Consolidated Fund, 
which can be discussed in the Parliament but not 
subject to vote therein. This provision theoretically 
provides significant financial independence to the 
OCAG. In practice, the budget proposal of the OCAG is 
treated like that of other government agencies6 during 
approval. The Finance Division exercises budgetary 
control on the expenditure of the OCAG in order to 
maintain financial discipline. Once approved, the 
CAG has only the authority to re-appropriate budget 
between units of expenditure other than earmarked 
items in the Appropriation Act. Financial independece 
and accountibility will be improved if  the Office plans 
its targeted performance and activities in advance 
according to its constitutional mandate and prepare 
the budget proposal accordingly. Each proposed 
expenditure in the budget should be clearly linked 
to the targeted activities and performance. This will 
help justify the budget proposal and enhance financial 
accountability of the Office without the intervention of 
the Finance Division. On receiving the proposal during 
budget preparation, the Finance Division may comment 
on it instead of altering it. A special parliamentary 
committee may discuss the proposal along with 
the comments made by the Finance Division. Once 
approved in the Parliament through the Appropriation 
Act, the CAG should have the autonomy to disburse 
the allocation according to the approved budget. 
Policy recommendation: The enabling Act 
should provide necessary financial autonomy 
to the CAG subject to proper justification of 
the budget proposal.
1.2 Appointment and Status  of the CAG
While Article 127 of the Constitution provides the 
President of the Republic with the authority to appoint 
the CAG, Article 48(3) compels the President to act 
on the advice of the Prime Minister in relation to this 
appointment. Moreover, no law at present exists to 
either stipulate any appointment process or eligibility 
criteria that candidates must meet.  The absence 
of a transparent process and objective criteria 
for appointment provides considerable room for 
politicisation, a significant concern in Bangladesh, 
where there is a history of public institutions being 
politicised. Hitherto, the seniority principle has been 
followed in appointing the CAG except for a few cases. 
The first eight CAGs were appointed from among 
officers of the Audit and Accounts cadre, who had 
left the OCAG to join the Ministry of Establishment at 
Deputy Secretary level. The ninth and the tenth CAGs 
were appointed from within the OCAG. These two 
trends might spur a competition between senior-most 
officers of the said cadre working within and outside 
the OCAG. Such competition might result in further 
politicisation. Moreover, seniority alone cannot ensure 
the best possible selection since top management 
positions like the CAG require  proactive leadership 
and superior management skills on top of professional 
knowledge and experience.
 
5 Article 140(2) of the Constitution has required the President 
consult with the PSC on matters relating to qualifidcations and 
methods of the recruitment; principles to be followed in making 
appointments, promotions and transfers; matters affecting the 
terms and conditions of the service; and the discipline of the 
service.   
6 The Rules of Business authorises the Finance Division to regulate 
appropriation, re-appropriation and disbursement of expenditure 
of all government agencies in order to ensure financial discipline.
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Policy recommendation: A transparent and 
clearly laid down process of appointment of 
the CAG, as well as eligibility criteria for this 
appointment should be introduced through 
legislation. 
As the post is technical in nature, prospective 
candidates should have considerable experience 
in government accounting and auditing functions. 
For ensuring leadership and management capacity, 
candidates should be Grade I government officers or 
equivalent having considerable experience of serving 
in managerial positions within the government. 
Integrity of the prospective candidates can be 
assessed through examining whether they have any 
audit objection pending against them, have a criminal 
record, have suffered disciplinary punishment or have 
defaulted loans, utility bills or taxes, etc.  A ‘Supreme 
Audit Select Committee’ can be formed to identify 
qualified candidates according to the set criteria for 
consideration of the President. The Speaker of the 
House, the Leader of the Opposition in the Parliament 
and the Chief Justice may comprise the committee to 
make it credible and non-partisan.  
The status of the CAG as given in the Warrant 
of Precedence (15th position while the Cabinet 
Secretary holds the 12th position) is derogatory to 
the independent functioning of the Office. In India, the 
CAG is placed in the 9th position, which is higher than 
the Cabinet Secretary and the Members of Parliament. 
Proper status of the CAG is important to get access to 
all necessary documents and to accelerate the audit 
settlement process.
    
Policy recommendation: The Government 
can revise the Warrant of Precedence to 
confer the CAG with the status that matches 
the authority and the dignity of the position.  
  
1.3 Separation between Audit and Accounts
The fundamental logic for a separation between audit 
and accounts is that the organisation and persons 
responsible for keeping the accounts should not audit 
them. Within the OCAG as it exists today, this separation 
does not exist, as there is one Audit and Accounts 
cadre making it possible that the person responsible for 
keeping the accounts to, at a future date, be responsible 
for auditing them. Since July 2002, there has been 
partial separation, when the responsibility of keeping 
government accounts was entrusted with the Office of 
the Controller General of Accounts (OCGA), part of the 
Finance Division administratively.  But the personnel have 
not been separated as officers of the Audit and Accounts 
cadre serve both the OCAG and the OCGA. This partial 
separation has not, however, been applied in all cases, 
as the officials of the OCAG still continue to keep, 
prepare financial statements, and audit the accounts for 
the Railway and Defence services.
The OCAG claims that they are aware about possible 
conflict of interests and they avoid it by ensuring 
that the personnel who audit the accounts do not 
maintain them. For example, Civil Audit Directorate 
of the OCAG audits the OCGA and personnel in the 
OCGA are usually not placed in that Directorate and 
vice versa. They also argue that as the Office has 
a generalist recruitment system, officers can learn 
government accounting techniques by serving in 
accounts positions, which helps them to become 
better auditors at a later point; and second, integration 
of audit and accounts provides the CAG with some 
control over the pre-audit7.
 
However, partial separation as it exists today has led 
to three main problems. First, pre-audit, which was 
under the purview of the OCAG before separation and 
now placed under the OCGA, has been weakened8. 
Second, entrusting power of audit and accounts 
with the same cadre personnel weakens checks 
and balances in the financial control process. Third, 
the Office has to spend extra managerial resources 
for managing conflict of interests. The OCAG is of 
the opinion that it should have control over the pre-
audit through keeping accounts personnel under 
its supervision so that financial irregularities can be 
prevented before payment takes place.     
Policy recommendation: The OCGA should 
be strengthened by awarding proper status 
and functional autonomy in a bid to strengthen 
pre-audit. Effective internal control system and 
internal audit should be in place in all auditees. 
Subject to fulfilment of these two conditions, 
audit should be completely separated from 
accounts within an agreed timeframe.9
7 Pre-audit takes place before the payment is made to ensure that 
the expenditure has been made following due process.
8  The Controller General of Accounts (CGA) who is entrusted with 
the pre-audit functions is an Additional Secretary level officer and 
works under the Finance Division. Therefore, s/he remains under 
immense pressure for passing bills.
9  The CAG Office disagrees over the separation of the Audit and 
Accounts cadre and opines that cadre separation will increase 
corruption and reduce career prospect of the Audit and Accounts 
cadre. It claims that conflict of interests exists in the functions of 
other cadres too. 
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According to the Right to Information Act 2009, the 
OCAG needs to segregate and index its information 
related to audit activities, administrative issues, 
financial and personnel matters in order to provide 
the public the demanded information in time. The 
Office can use its website and print media to circulate 
such reports. It will be better if the Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) of the Parliament discusses annual 
reports and provides the Office with necessary 
recommendations.  
2.2 Audit of the OCAG
As the OCAG facilitates financial accountability of 
other government agencies through an audit, the 
question arises as to who ensures the financial 
accountability of the OCAG. The Constitution 
authorises the CAG to audit public accounts. 
Therefore, there is no other authorised body to audit 
public accounts, which naturally puts a bar on an 
external audit of the OCAG. However, Parliament 
may enact a law allowing for an external audit of 
the OCAG in accordance with Articles 81 and 85 of 
the Constitution10 . In the UK, Canada and Australia, 
designated parliamentary committee appoints an 
external audit firm and discusses the resulting audit 
report. Apart from an external audit firm, a peer 
review audit is a possibility - thus the OCAG, which 
is the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) of Bangladesh, 
may be audited by a SAI of another country. 
Policy recommendation: Parliament may, by 
way of legislation, introduce an external audit 
of the OCAG11 . The OCAG can promote the 
idea of a peer review audit in the International 
Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions 
and the Asian Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions. 
      
If a peer review audit is pursued, a reciprocal audit 
should be avoided, i.e. if the Indian CAG audits its 
Bangladeshi counterpart, the latter should audit 
SAIs other than that of India. Such peer review audit 
reports should be made public, and preferably be 
discussed in the Parliament. Peer review audits should 
concentrate more on internal control system audit 
and performance audit rather than on compliance 
and financial statement audit.
10 According to Articles 81 and 85 of the Constitution, Parliament 
has the authority to regulate public monies and enact laws relating 
to audit of government accounts.  
11 The OCAG disagreed on this issue. It is of the opinion that 
its accountability is ensured through internal control and PAC’s 
review of audit reports.
2. ACCOUNTABILITY
2.1 Transparency
Transparency leads to accountability. If people 
have easy access to information about what the 
OCAG does, its rationale and approaches, they can 
evaluate the activities of the Office and support it 
for better results and question it when it performs 
below the mark. Unfortunately, the public is not 
aware of the activities of the OCAG, suggesting 
a large communication gap. The activities of the 
Office, its reports and other documents of public 
interest are not available in the public domain. Audit 
reports, which are laid before the Parliament, are not 
accessible to the public and are outdated. Section 
4 of the Code of Ethics for Government Auditors 
issued by the CAG provides that the Audit Office can 
communicate audit reports to the public after their 
submission to the Parliament. But this provision is 
yet to be adhered to.
Policy recommendation: The OCAG should 
upload complete audit reports on its website 
(and on the websites of the concerned 
auditees) and arrange a press conference to 
inform the public about important findings on 
the same day reports are presented to the 
Parliament.
 
The proposed enabling Act should clearly mention 
this responsibility of the CAG. The Office should 
also inform the public how to obtain its documents. 
The OCAG publishes an annual report and quarterly 
newsletters regularly highlighting its achievements 
and programmes. These rarely include critical 
analysis of its own performance. If the annual report 
presents a comparison between achievements of 
the current year and the previous year, it will help the 
public assess the performance. Further, the report 
should include achievement against the target set, 
analysis of reasons if the target is not met, current 
budget expenditure for each target, plan for the 
next year and subsequent budgetary allocation, and 
challenges that might hinder the achievement of the 
target. 
Policy recommendation: The annual report 
of the OCAG should be more transparent and 
candid through a critical analysis of different 
aspects of its performance, trend analysis 
of achievements, statement of income and 
expenditure and future challenges. Wider 
circulation of the annual report should be 
ensured.
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Policy recommendation: The Office should 
formulate a training policy after analysing skill 
needs at various levels of the organisation 
and considering the objectives of its strategic 
plan. Training policy should incorporate 
strategies for better utilisation of training.
Since training produces better results if linked 
to career planning, placement and promotion 
should be linked with training, with relevant training 
programmes functioning as a minimum qualification 
for appointment to various positions.
3.2.2 Use of Technology
The use of information technology (IT) can increase 
efficiency if the staffs have the appropriate skills 
to utilise new systems and programmes. The 
OCAG introduced a computerised audit tracking 
system known as Audit Monitoring System (AMS) 
to compile information about the follow-up of audit 
observations. In addition, the Office has recently 
decided to introduce CAAT (Computer Assisted Audit 
Technique) to enhance audit efficiency. However, 
the two systems lack IT capacity, both in terms of 
infrastructure and trained human resources. The 
strategic plan 2007-2012, has taken enhancement 
of IT capacity as a pillar. 
Policy recommendation: The OCAG should 
reassess the IT needs of the Office and 
formulate an IT capacity development plan. 
3.3 Building Corporate Knowledge
Each year, a significant number of officials of the OCAG 
get overseas scholarships and training, which could 
be better used to benefit the Office. For instance, 
on their return, they could organise a workshop and 
submit a report, highlighting what they learnt and 
how they can be applied here. The Office can also 
store learning from unique cases, good practices, 
experience of deputed officials, and ground breaking 
research work. Audit trails of a particular auditee can 
be a vital generator of knowledge, which can be an 
efficient means of audit planning. 
Policy recommendation: The Office can 
invest in developing a corporate knowledge 
storehouse to utilise in its training programmes 
and to facilitate the audit planning process.
12 Attrition is a manpower rationalisation technique that stops 
recruitment in a certain position and abolishes it when the official 




Undertaking an audit is a complex technical task that 
requires not only specialised knowledge, but also an 
analytical mind and sound professional judgment. 
Therefore, the OCAG requires a blend of professionally 
capable manpower from various academic disciplines 
to conduct a quality audit in a cost effective manner. At 
present, class III officials of the Office comprise 61.52% 
of the total manpower (OCAG, 2008), and form the 
main entry point for recruitment into the organisation. 
Class II employees comprise 14.16% of the manpower, 
and are mainly promoted from class III after passing 
the Subordinate Accounts Service Examination. Very 
few class I cadre officers are recruited each year. In the 
administrative culture of Bangladesh, class III employees 
are considered clerks, with a poor salary and low status, 
hardly a recipe to attract the best candidates. They 
have a mindset that is not resonant with a performance 
culture (World Bank, 2002). If the Office can attract 
better candidates, it will have better auditors with higher 
productivity at a lower training cost.
Policy recommendation: The Office should 
reassess its manpower composition in 
terms of technical efficiency, training and 
compensation cost, effect on organisational 
culture and size of the organisation. 
The Office may consider a reasonable reduction 
in class III posts through attrition12 and increase 
class II posts instead. A significant ratio of class II 
posts should be directly recruited according to the 
needs of the Office. The newly established Human 
Resource Cell may undertake a baseline study for 
such reorganisation.
3.2 Better Utilisation of the Existing Human Resources
3.2.1 Training
The Office has no shortage of training programmes. 
Nevertheless there is room to extract better results 
out of current expenditure on training, through the 
formulation of a training policy and an action plan that 
will address the objectives of the OCAG’s strategic 
plan and the professional needs of its officials. The 
Office can measure periodically the need for different 
skills at various levels of the organisation to achieve 
its strategic goals. The training policy should clearly 
lay down development of training for trainers and 
creating a pool of such trainers as well, and be revised 
periodically in accordance with changing needs.
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and updated so that high-risk areas of transaction, 
internal control status, critical contextual factors and 
follow-up of audit objections can easily be identified. 
Policy recommendation: The Office should 
develop a database on each auditable entity 
for better risk-based audit planning. 
The Office can periodically review the risk-based 
audit techniques that it follows in order to improve 
its techniques. 
 
The internal control system of the auditee is a critical 
factor for assessing risk. A better internal control 
system reduces the cost of a test audit by reducing 
the number of verifications. The Office conducted an 
internal control system survey in 2000. Thereafter the 
government introduced an internal control system 
manual for government agencies. However, the 
Office has not audited the internal control system of 
auditees since then.
Policy recommendation: The Office should 
resume conducting audits of the internal 
control system of some selected bodies each 
year.
      
Apart from the risk-based planning approach, the 
Office can introduce a demand based planning where 
the OCAG can audit some entities and projects 
which are of significant public interest in the current 
year. This will make the Office more responsive to the 
need of the society. To identify such issues, the CAG 
can form a committee under his/her leadership. 
Policy recommendation: The CAG can form 
an Audit Advisory Committee to advise 
the Office in identifying organisations and 
projects that are of significant public interest 
in the current year.
The committee may comprise of the former CAGs and 
bureaucrats, civil society members, representatives 
from Institute of Chartered Accountants, think tank 
organisations and NGOs.  
4.3 Compliance and Cooperation by Auditee 
The effectiveness of the audit to a great extent 
depends upon how the auditees cooperate with 
the auditors. Unfortunately, non-cooperation by the 
auditee takes many forms - for instance, they may 
not preserve documents in an audit-friendly manner. 
This would lead to inneficiency where more time is 
spent finding the documents than auditing them.
4. EFFECTIVENESS  
4.1 Quality of the Audit
The Office has introduced a number of measures 
over the years to enhance the quality of the audit. A 
Quality Assurance Committee has been established 
in each Directorate and a Central Quality Assurance 
Committee has been established in the CAG’s 
Office. Quality checklists have also been issued. 
The Government Audit Standard prescribes a 
particular standard of quality at each stage of 
audit; unfortunately, these measures are not strictly 
adhered to. The main reasons identified are the lack 
of skill and awareness among the auditors, lack of 
supervision and limited resources invested for quality 
assurance.
Policy recommendation: Auditors should be 
trained in different aspects of audit quality, 
and made familiar with tools and techniques 
to ensure such quality. Senior officials can be 
engaged in supervising high-risk entities.
 
In addition, the quality of audit observations should be 
considered during performance evaluation. Periodic 
discussions with concerned stakeholders can be 
arranged to get their feedback on audit quality. 
                 
4.2 Risk and Demand based Audit Planning
Risk and demand based audit planning can result 
in better and more efficient auditing. The Office 
follows a risk based audit approach whereby over 
22000 audit entities have been categorised into A 
(20% of auditable entities audited each year), B (20% 
of auditable entities audited every three years) and 
C (the rest 60% of auditable entities audited every 
5/7 years). Such categorisation is based on volume 
of transaction and budget allocation. Apart from 
these two, the nature of the activities of the auditee 
is a material aspect of audit. For example, a large 
spending auditee might spend the lion’s share of its 
budget in salary payment, which is a low-risk area. 
On the other hand, a medium spending auditee 
might spend more in procurement, construction, 
transportation, and storage, which are high-risk areas. 
This process is not very systematic. It is, therefore, 
imperative for the Office to have a database on the 
revenue and expenditure trail of all auditable entities 
for risk-based planning. Auditees often complain that 
auditors hardly take account of the contextual needs 
of the audited body. To address this issue, the audit 
trail of each auditable entity has to be researched 
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Policy recommendation: The OCAG may 
recommend modes of documentation to 
government agencies. The proposed enabling 
Act should make such recommendations 
binding on the government. 
Most of the time, auditees delay in responding to 
the queries of the OCAG. Usually the Office provides 
45 days for responding after issuing the Local 
Inspection Report, although this appears to be more 
an administrative requirement than a legally binding 
one. That’s why the 45 days timeline is not followed.
Policy recommendation: The proposed 
enabling Act should provide that failure to 
respond against audit queries in bad faith 
would be considered as misconduct, subject 
to disciplinary action.
4.4 Enforcement and Follow-up of Audit 
Observations
The OCAG reports a large number of audit 
observations involving huge amounts of money each 
year. The Office also follows up recommendations 
of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) made on 
audit observations but does not report findings of 
such follow-up to the PAC.  Moreover, there are 
cases in which the auditee took more than 15 years 
to respond to the recommendations of the PAC (IGS, 
2009). 
Policy recommendation: The proposed 
enabling Act should make the submission of 
follow-up audit reports to the PAC mandatory. 
At the same time, follow-up reports should 
be made public. A penalty against the head 
of an audited entity can be introduced if  
s/he fails to implement the recommendations 
of the PAC in time. 
4.5 Relationship between Auditors and Auditees
An audit should be considered as an aid to better 
management of the auditable entity.  In practice, 
the relationship between the auditors and auditees 
is strained, due to a number of reasons:  auditors’ 
attitudes are grounded in “fault-finding”; there is a 
lack of understanding about financial rules and 
regulations among both auditors and auditees; 
and auditees have a poor understanding about 
the audit process. Interaction between the Finance 
Division, auditable entities and the OCAG is critical 
to developing a healthy relationship. 
Policy recommendation: There should be 
separate audit cells in the finance division 
and all auditable entities and a stakeholder 
management cell in the OCAG to make their 
interaction timely and easier.
CONCLUSION
In a resource constrained country like Bangladesh, 
the audit plays a critical role to ensure better utilisation 
of public money and prevent fraud. Commitment 
from all sides, i.e. government, PAC, and auditable 
entities is required to set the stage for the OCAG 
to play its due role. Instead, what is seen is lack 
of commitment. The government is undermining 
the OCAG by making it dependent for resources. 
Auditable entities are hampering the audit process, 
causing considerable inefficiency to the OCAG. Most 
importantly, the OCAG lacks initiatives to be more 
focused in the public domain, which is critical to its 
independent and effective functioning. The policy 
recommendations as mentioned above are expected 
to address these barriers through institutionalising 
proactive leadership at the top and effective 
interaction with the Parliament, the government, 
media, civil society and people.   
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